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Abstract
A one dimensional cellular automata model, describing the evolutionary dynamics of
cooperation when grouping by cooperators provides protection against predation, is used to
compare the dynamics of evolution of cooperation in three settings: in G only vertical
transmission of information is allowed, as an analogy of genetic evolution with heredity; in H
only horizontal information transfer is simulated through diffusion of the majority's opinion, as
an analogy of opinion dynamics or social learning, and in C, the analogy of cultural evolution,
information is transmitted both horizontally (H) and vertically (V) as learned behavior is
transmitted to offspring. Our results show that the evolutionary prevalence of cooperative
behavior depends on the costs and benefits of cooperation so that: a) cooperation becomes the
dominant behavior, even in the presence of free-riders (i.e., non-cooperators obtain benefits
from the cooperation of others), under all scenarios, if the benefits of cooperation compensate
for its cost; b) G is more susceptible to selection pressure than H achieving a closer adaptation
to the fitness landscape; c) evolution of cooperative behavior in H is less sensitive to the cost of
cooperation than in G; and d) C achieves higher levels of cooperation than the other
alternatives at low costs, whereas H does it at high costs. Our results also suggest that a
synergy between H and V is elicited making the dominance of cooperation much more likely
under cultural evolution than under the hereditary kind where only V is present.
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 Introduction
1.1
Biologists, economists, computer scientists and physicists have all worked to further our
understanding of human and animal cooperation. Yet different premises underlay these efforts.
The main difference among them is the assumption that social behavior arrived through
biological evolution among animals, and that culture and rational decision making is a principal
driver of the evolution of cooperation and sociality among humans (Richardson and Boyd 2004).
Human cooperation seems to be molded by both cultural and biological forces (Lumsden and
Wilson 1981; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, 2003; Kurzban and Houser 2005) and using
theories for biological evolution has provided a fertile ground to study the dynamics of
processes governed by cultural evolution, such as human cooperation (Hammerstein 2004) and
economics (Nelson and Winter 1982). However, important differences between the dynamics ofcultural evolution (deWaal 2001; Richardson and Boyd 2004; Ehrlich and Levin 2005) and
biological evolution (Pagel and Mace 2004; Nowak and Sigmund 2004) exist, although both
processes are often mixed up when studying the evolution of cooperation (see Nowak and
Sigmund 2005, for example). A fundamental difference between both kinds of evolution is the
interplay of genotype and phenotype in biological evolution that is absent in the cultural kind.
Possibly, fundamental differences in the direction of information flow, either only vertically in
biological evolution and horizontally in social processes are also important. This is the subject
of the present experiment in silico.
1.2
Attempts at explaining the maintenance of societies in these biological terms have invoked
mechanisms such as kin selection (Hamilton 1964), need for parental investment through the
establishment of families (Queller et al. 1988) or colonies (Gadagkar 2001), positive fitness
effects (Lehmann and Keller 2006), and economic "added values" of social relationships, by
which social individuals receive more synergistic benefits than loners (Jaffe 2001). A particular
example of biological process maintaining sociality is that of the "selfish herd," a concept
introduced by Hamilton in 1971. It explains why animals are less at risk when the density of
conspecifics around them is greater and hence, supports the hypothesis of the origin and
maintenance of grouping behavior based solely on selective grounds, without further need of
additional assumptions. Indeed, previous results suggest that critical group size is the
parameter that often determines the maintenance of primitive social behavior in populations
(Cipriani and Jaffe 2005).
1.3
Processes invoked to explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in a more
sociological setting include: reciprocity or mutualistic interaction, originally proposed by
Axelrod and Hamilton (1981), supported by important theoretical and empirical results (see
Nowak and Sigmund 2004) and possibly working across species (Osborn and Jaffe 1997);
indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others in order to uphold their reputation,
increasing their chance to be included in future cooperation (Nowak and Sigmund 1998;
Panchanathan and Boyd 2004); altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gachter 2002); and direct fitness
effects and/or economic forces benefiting all individuals in a cooperative group (Jaffe 2002,
2004; Lehmann and Keller 2006).
1.4
Few papers have explicitly compared the effects of cultural and biological evolution on the
maintenance of sociality (Boyd and Richardson 1985; Bull et al. 2000; Acerbi and Parisi 2006).
Basically, scenarios involving biological evolution (i.e., Darwinian evolution) depend on the
proportional transmission of hereditary information via genes from parents to offspring ,G,
while scenarios involving cultural evolution result from at least two different dynamic processes:
a) vertical flux of information, V, in which offspring acquire relevant behavior via learning
and/or imitation from parents (i.e, Lamarckian evolution), and b) horizontal flux of information,
H, resulting from a number of mechanisms, all involving learning and/or imitation from peers
(Boyd and Richardson 1996; Best 1999).
1.5
In this study, we use the term culture as that defined by Axelrod (1997): the set of individual
attributes that are subject to social influence. We are aware that the term culture denotes a
multitude of concepts which we are not addressing in this work. We call culture, due to a lack of
a better word, the simultaneous occurrence of transmission of information from parents to
offspring (V) and from peer to peer (H). This definition is congruent with that used by Acerbi
and Parisi (2006) and should be considered as a simple preliminary metaphor for human
culture.
1.6
Theoretical processes and concepts related to V and H are less operatively evident than those
related to G, as in the latter characters are uniquely transmitted from parents to descendants by
their genes and morphological structures coded by genes, or genes themselves, are relatively
easy to identify and track. On the contrary, V and H have many different algorithmic analogies
and are harder to model, they may interact with G, and cultural characters or "memes" (Dawkins
1976) are not easily identifiable.1.7
Of the many features characterizing systems driven by biological and cultural evolution, here we
study the effects of the dynamics of V and H on the dominance of social roles, regardless of
possible differences in its mechanisms. We want to further our understanding of an important
unresolved issue related to these evolutionary scenarios: a) G, as in Darwinian evolution, is
prevalent in biological systems and is characterized by a the exclusive prevalence of vertical (V)
information flow, b) H, common in social systems in which learning occurs by imitation from
peers, and c) the combination of both H + V, as in Lamarckian evolution, representing learning
from peers and from parents, is the closest metaphor to culture in our experiments for what we
will call it C. Here we will compare the different evolutionary scenarios in regard to their




We modify a time-discrete, one-dimensional, circular grid model (Cipriani and Jaffe 2005),
which is a version of the well known "selfish herd" model of Hamilton (1971). The model
assumes that cultural and biological dynamics is driven by a flux of information and by natural
selection on the phenotypes (i.e., roles) of individuals, but does not involve group selection
mechanisms. We simulate a population of interacting haploid agents, each of them interpreting
different social roles or phenotypes: a) cooperative members (co) are agents that reduce the
predation rates of their immediate neighbors (co or fr), b) non-cooperative members (nco) are
agents that do not affect the predation rates on neighbors and do not receive cooperation, and
c) free riders (fr) are agents taking full advantage of the behavior of their cooperative neighbors,
benefiting from the reduced predation pressure, without corresponding equivalently. The
inclusion of free riders in this model was motivated by the fact that, in evolutionary terms,
cooperation is difficult to achieve and maintain under the presence of cheaters and free-riders
(e.g., Nowak and Sigmund 2005). Thus we think that the presence of free-riders and their
interaction with other social roles are fundamental in understanding the dynamics of
cooperation in both cultural and biological scenarios.
2.2
Because co is the role capable of generating cooperative groups, in our simulations we only
compare roles in a pair wise fashion, co vs. nco and co vs. fr. Starting from a random uniform
spatial distribution, in each iteration every agent interacts with both its immediate neighbors,
sequentially, according to its position in the model, using the majority rule. In consequence,
three adjacent cooperative individuals make the minimal expected group size while groups of
larger sizes result from the dynamics of the model.
2.3
Horizontal transmission of information (H) occurs through the "majority rule", which is a
mechanism for the transmission of behaviors, believes, attitudes, and ideas, that has been
successfully explored in several theoretical models (e.g.,Anderlini and Ianni 1996; Henrich and
Boyd 1998). In the majority rule, any individual accepts norms that are applied by its neighbors
or by the majority of individuals with whom it interacts. In our one-dimensional model, if both
nco´s neighbors are co, then the nco agent is converted to co with probability pnco- co. The same
happens to co agents found between two nco, with probability pco- nco. For example, if "_" are
empty spaces, following this sequential rule from position 1 to n, the group of agents co-
nco_nco-co-nco-nco_co__co-nco-co-co become co-nco_nco-nco-nco-nco_co__co-co-co-co in one
single pass. The same rationale applies for fr. The fact that the agent's phenotype can be
simultaneously transmitted from parents to offspring and from peer to peer (i.e., are subject to
social influence), allows us to simulate culture C.
2.4
In each iteration, all empty cells are occupied by new recruits, co, nco or fr, with probability rco,
rnco or rfr, respectively. Agents reproduce during their lifetime at no cost, and rco + rnco = rco +rfr = 1. When simulating G, the proportion of newborn co to nco and co to fr is the same as that
of the surviving parents in the previous iteration (i.e., with heredity). That is, the probability that
a recruit with a particular social role occupies an empty space at time t is proportional to the
relative numbers of agents on that social role in the population at time t - 1. To avoid H when
simulating G, we set pco-nco = pnco-co = pconv = 0. In H, the proportion of newborn co to nco, or
co to fr, is constant with a 1:1 ratio (i.e., without heredity, rco and rnco or rco and rfr are constant
and have the same value) and 0 < pconv ≤ 1. Finally, to simulate C (H+V), we set rco and rnco or
rco and rfr at time t as the proportions of their respective agents in the population at time t - 1,
and 0 < pconv ≤ 1.
2.5
At every time step in the simulation, all agents are subject to predation, the mechanism of
natural selection. If an agent is predated upon, it dies and leaves an empty space to be
populated in the next iteration. Grouping by cooperators provides protection against this
process given that the probability of predation on each agent depends on the state of both its
neighbors: (a) a co with two cooperative neighbors is predated upon with probability p2n; (b) a co
with only one cooperative neighbor is predated upon with probability p1n; (c) a co without
cooperative neighbors is predated upon with probability p0n, and (d) a nco is always predated
upon with probability pnco.
2.6
Free riding was modeled by modifying predator rates according to the following rules: a) any fr
with co neighbors is predated as any co and b) if fr is a neighbor of any co, its effect on the
predation rate of the co is equal to that exerted by any other nco. That is, fr profits from having
co neighbors as any co would do, yet fr does not provide any benefit to neighbors. Making pfr
=pncoallowed fr to suffer predation as any nco did when surrounded only by fr.
2.7
Besides predation, each agent may also die according to a fixed rate of natural mortality, mco,
mnco, and mfr. As in the case of predation, when any agent dies by means of m, it leaves an
empty space that is populated in the next iteration. The cost of being cooperative is simulated
setting mco so that 0 < mco ≤ 1, mnco ≤ mco, and mfr ≤ mco.
Simulations
2.8
We implemented the model using MS Visual Basic, running our simulations on populations with
104 cells. In some simulations, frequencies converged very fast, before reaching 102 iterations,
while others needed longer runs, up to 104 steps or more. As we were interested in comparing
the likelihood of cooperators overpowering non-cooperators, we assumed that competing
agents with opposing strategies existed in the population by the time the simulation started. At
initial conditions, an average of one half of the number of cells was randomly populated by co
while the other half was populated by nco or fr.
2.9
In this study, we simulated three different evolutionary scenarios, G, H, and C (C =H+V), and
compared them against control runs in which no transmission of information occurred and
changes in the proportions of co were dependent only on differential predation.
2.10
When H was active, pconv = 1, otherwise pconv = 0. The effects of intermediate values of pconv on
the maintenance of cooperation will be discussed elsewhere. Cooperation resulting from H
spread via immediate neighbors while cooperation resulting from G and V spread through
offspring planted in random empty spaces. To correct for this potential bias when comparing
these scenarios, we randomly shuffled the location of all the agents each time step after
reproduction occurred (but seeJensen 1998). Besides the order of functions shown in the section
Flow (above), we also tested simulations in which reshuffling occurred just after reproduction.Given that during reproduction new agents randomly occupy available cells, not surprisingly
reshuffling options had no effect on simulation results. Thus, in all our simulations, processes
followed the order described in the first place. The dynamics of co under G, H, and C was tested
against a range of cooperation costs mco = 0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 0.9, 1 and mnco = mfr = 0. Different
fitness advantages for grouping were obtained, producing fitness advantages for grouping of 1,
2, …, 5 times relative to non grouping, simulating predation conditions: p0n = pnco = 0.1, 0.2, 
…, 0.5 and p2n = p1n = 0.1 respectively. The effects of cooperation costs mco on the
proportions of co were tested against different selection regimes providing various degrees of
fitness advantage to co when in groups.
Flow
2.11
Every simulation followed these steps:
.  1 Initialization of the system:
.  i Reading parameter values from GUI.
.  ii Saving parameter values in text file.
.  iii Dimensioning arrays.
.  iv Positioning of agents according to a random uniform distribution.
.  v Calculation of numbers and proportion (heredity) of agents.
.  vi Saving data on numbers and proportions in text file.
.  2 Simulation loop starts here:
.  i Horizontal transmission of information (H) by majority rule
.  ii Optional random shuffling of the positions of all agents
.  iii Predation
.  iv Natural mortality
.  v Optional calculation of numbers and proportion (heredity) of agents.
.  vi Reproduction
.  vii Optional calculation of numbers and proportion (heredity) of agents.
.  viii Saving data on numbers and proportions in text file.
.  3 Simulation loop stops here.
.  4 Releasing memory from arrays.
.  5 End.
2.12




The maintenance of sociality varied according to the type of evolutionary process involved in the
dynamics of the population. Table 1 summarizes the effects of such processes when
cooperation had no cost on agents. Under low selection against grouping, co always
outnumbered nco and fr in all scenarios but in the control run (0.5) and G (0 to 1) of experiment
3. Of these, the proportions of co converged to 1 in all scenarios involving heredity. Also, under
scenario H, the proportions of co converged to relative high values (0.94 – 0.99). Control runs
involving nco resulted in frequencies of co (0.88 – 0.89) higher than those obtained from
simulations involving fr (0.50 – 0.52). Besides those mentioned so far, no other major
differences were observed between simulations using either nco or fr when cooperation had no
cost on co.
3.2
In all these simulations (Table 1), shuffling the locations of agents produced different results
than those obtained from simulations in which positions were not shuffled. The proportion of co
found in H scenarios without shuffling, was slightly lower than that observed in those H with
shuffling. The inverse tendency was found in control runs under low selection.Table 1: Average proportion of collaborators (co), competing against non
collaborators (nco) and free riders (fr), resulting from scenarios in which
cooperation has no cost to co, and genetic and non genetic information is
transmitted from parents to offspring and from peers to peers with
different mechanisms: G, vertical transmission of information using genes;
H, horizontal transmission of non genetic information; C, horizontal and
vertical transmission of non genetic information; and Control runs, in which
transmission of information never occurs. All standard deviations are
smaller than 1.5%. Selection settings: p0n = pnco = 0.5 and p2n = p1n = 0.1.
Shuffling: agent's locations were randomly swapped; Heredity: the
proportion of newborn is the same as that of the surviving parents in
previous time step. Without heredity, rco, rnco, and rfr = 0.5.
Exp. Scenarios Shuffling Heredity Proportion of co
1 G Y Y 1.00
co vs nco H Y N 0.99
C Y Y 1.00
Control Y N 0.88
2 G N Y 1.00
co vs nco H N N 0.98
C N Y 1.00
Control N N 0.89
3 G Y Y 0 or 1
co vs fr H Y N 0.99
C Y Y 1.00
Control Y N 0.50
4 G N Y 1.00
co vs fr H N N 0.94
C N Y 1.00
Control N N 0.52
3.3
Cooperation costs affected the dominance of co under different evolutionary scenarios (Figure
1) when predation conditions were p0n = pnco = 0.5 and p2n = p1n = 0.1. In G and C, co
dominated nco in populations when cooperation costs were low (under 0.5). In these scenarios,
the shift of dominance from co to other strategies was abrupt. Under C, cooperators competing
either with nco or fr, dominated the population at higher costs than under G, only when
locations of agents were randomly shuffled (Figures 1B and 1D). Without shuffling (Figures 1A
and 1C), the dominance switched from co to the competing strategy within the same range of
cooperation costs in G and C.Figure 1. Average proportion of collaborators (co), competing against non collaborators (nco)
and free riders (fr), resulting from scenarios in which cooperation had a cost on co, and
information was transmitted using different mechanisms: G, vertical transmission of
information using genes, large white circles; H, horizontal transmission of non genetic
information, white squares; C, horizontal and vertical transmission of non genetic information,
small black circles; and Control, without transmission of information, white triangles. A. co vs.
nco with random shuffling of agent's locations; B. co vs. nco without random shuffling; C. co vs.
fr with random shuffling. The proportion of co under G oscillated between 0 and 1 (not shown);
D. co vs. fr without random shuffling. All standard deviations are smaller than 1.5%. Selection
settings: p0n = pnco = 0.5 and p2n = p1n = 0.1. Costs on cooperators: mco = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ...,
0.9, 1 and mnco = mfr = 0.
3.4
In all but one case under G and C (Figure 2C), the range of cost's values within which the
dominance of co shifts to a competing strategy (i.e., threshold values) strongly depended on the
selection applied on agents not forming groups (Figure 2). This strong dependence was found
to be particularly evident in the experiments in which co competed against nco (Figures 2A and
2B). However, it is important to keep in mind that the C scenario offered an advantage to co only
when cost's threshold ranges, under identical levels of selection, were higher than those found
under G. These particular conditions only existed when agent's locations were not shuffled
(Figures 2B and 2D) but occurred if co was either competing against nco or fr.Figure 2. Range of cooperation costs in which the dominance in populations switched from
collaborators to competing strategies in G and C, under different values of selection against
grouping agents. Experiments simulate collaborators (co) competing against non collaborators
(nco) and free riders (fr) under two different scenarios: G, vertical transmission of information
using genes, gray bars; C, horizontal and vertical transmission of non genetic information,
black bars. A. co vs. nco with random shuffling of agent's locations; B. co vs. nco without
random shuffling; C. co vs. fr with random shuffling; D. co vs. fr without random shuffling.
Selection settings: p0n = pnco = 0.2, 0.3, …, 0.9 and p2n = p1n = 0.1. Costs on cooperators:
mco = 0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 0.9, 1 and mnco = mfr = 0.
3.5
Threshold values in simulations using nco (Figure 2B) were higher under C than under G, when
selection increased from 0.2 to 0.6. With predation rates larger than 0.6, threshold values in
both scenarios became identical. In simulations using fr under C, threshold values also
increased with selection, from p0n = pnco = 0.3 to 0.9 (Figure 2D), even if threshold values
under G were independent of predation rates. However, in both G and C with p0n = pnco = 0.8
and 0.9, the sizes of threshold ranges doubled (Figure 2D). It is worth mentioning that the lower
bounds of threshold ranges in Figure 2C were rather unstable, even if in the figure are shown as
being equal to 0.
3.6
Under selection defined by p0n = pnco = 0.2, proportions of co under H were almost always
smaller than those obtained in control runs (Figure 3). The exception was the value of co
obtained at a cost of 0.1, in the experiment testing nco without shuffling (Figure 3B). However,
even if the co value was larger than that obtained in the control run, this value was within thethreshold value of G with p0n = pnco = 0.2 (Figure 2D).
Figure 3. Average proportion of collaborators (co), competing against non collaborators (nco)
and free riders (fr), resulting from scenarios in which cooperation had a cost on co, and
information was transmitted using different mechanisms: H, horizontal transmission of non
genetic information, squares; Control, without transmission of information, triangles. A. co vs.
nco with random shuffling of agent's locations; B. co vs. nco without random shuffling; C. co vs.
fr with random shuffling; D. co vs. fr without random shuffling. All standard deviations are
smaller than 1.5%. Fitness advantages for cooperation: Low selection: p0n = pnco = 0.2 and p2n
= p1n = 0.1, white symbols; High selection p0n = pnco = 0.9 and p2n = p1n = 0.1, black
symbols. Costs on cooperators: mco = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9, 1 and mnco = mfr = 0.
3.7
Results in which co values obtained under H were larger than those obtained from control runs,
but smaller than those produced under G, were also found in the experiments testing nco with
p0n = pnco = 0.5 (Figures 1A and 1B). In these experiments, proportions of co under H became
immediately equal or lower than those in control runs within the cost's range in which the
dominance of co under C shifted to nco. Curiously, this was not the case for values of co
obtained from H in the experiment comparing co vs. fr without shuffling (Figure 1 D). There,
even if proportions of co were larger than those obtained from the control run, and lower than
those from G at low costs, values of co under H remained higher than those from the control
run well after the cost's range within which the dominance of co under C shifted to fr. Hence, in
this experiment, C allowed co to dominate the population at higher cooperation costs than G,
but H alone allowed co to dominate the population at still higher cooperation costs than C.3.8
Under selection at p0n = pnco = 0.9 (Figure 3), values of co under H with competing nco, were
slightly larger than those obtained from control runs along the range of cooperation costs
(Figures 3A and 3B) but smaller than, or well within the cost's threshold range, of co values
obtained under G (Figures 2A and 2B). Similarly, values of co under H with competing fr but
without shuffling, were larger than those obtained from control runs (Figure 3D) and decreased
linearly to cooperation costs. Given that the dominance of co in G shifts to nco between costs of
0.3 and 0.5 (Figure 2D), only those proportions of co higher than 0.5 are larger than those
obtained from G (Figure 3D). Hence, in this experiment, H allowed co to dominate the
population at higher cooperation costs than G only at costs larger than 0.5.
3.9
Finally, and similarly to other results with competing fr and shuffling, all proportions of co
obtained under H in these conditions, were smaller than those obtained from control runs
(Figure 3D) and are well within the cost's threshold values of G (Figure 2C).
3.10
A summary of the results in which scenarios linked to cultural evolution, C and H, allow
collaborators (co) to dominate populations at cooperation costs higher than those allowed by G,
are presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Schematic representation of scenarios linked to cultural evolution, C and H, allowing
collaborators (co) to dominate populations at cooperation costs higher than those allowed by
the scenario representing biological evolution, G. Darkened areas represent the cost
differential attributed to cultural evolution that benefits the dominance of co. The lower limits
of darkened areas are the co values resulting from control runs. Bars at the bottom of each plot
show the extent of costs along which different scenarios allow co to become the dominant
strategy. G, vertical transmission of information using genes, gray; C, horizontal and vertical
transmission of non genetic information, dark gray; H, horizontal transmission of non genetic
information, black. A. co competing against non collaborators (nco) without random shuffling
of agent's locations, under an intermediate fitness advantage for grouping or intermediate
selection (e.g., p0n = pnco = 0.5) on agents that do not form groups; B. co competing against
free riders (fr) without random shuffling, under a strong selection (e.g., p0n = pnco = 0.9) on
agents that do not form groups. Costs on cooperators: mco = 0, 0.1, 0.2, …, 0.9, 1 and mnco =
mfr = 0. Discussion
4.1
Results of comparing the three evolutionary scenarios, G (exclusive vertical transmission of
information), H (exclusive horizontal transmission of information), and C (horizontal and
vertical transmission of non genetic information), showed that cooperation is more likely to be
maintained in the population when competing either against non cooperators (nco) or free riders
(fr), under C for low costs of cooperation and under H for higher costs (Figure 4).
4.2
This difference can be explained by the fact that spatial restriction affected the results of our
simulations. The transmission of information of G and V occurred from parents to offspring.
When recruited, newcomers occupied random empty spaces along the grid, left behind by dead
agents. On the other hand, the information transmitted by H spread via immediate neighbors.
The most important consequence of this apparent incongruence was that the effects of H were
more likely to allow spatial correlations to build up in the model, so that the benefits of
cooperation were readily available "shielding" cooperative agents from natural selection (Soule
2005). Spatial correlations are unwanted when simulating mathematical models in which the
spatial scale is not explicitly considered. Spatial correlations can introduce strong biases
resulting in large quantitative and qualitative differences between the solution obtained by the
simulation and the actual solution of the mathematical model. However, from a social and
biological stand point, it seems natural to think that most processes occur in geometrical
spaces, for what spatial correlations are in fact mechanisms affecting the unfolding dynamics of
almost any system under study. In consequence, spatial correlations were approached as a new
parameter to be considered in the simulation rather than a potential bias. To reduce spatial
correlations, the positions of the agents that were not forming groups were randomly shuffled
immediately after the horizontal transmission of information occurred. The results of these
simulations were compared to those in which shuffling was not performed, or were reshuffling
as performed after the reproductive step (not shown). This comparison identified spatial
correlations as one necessary condition in our model, for co to overcome nco and fr strategies
using processes linked to cultural evolution (H + V) and H, under a wide range of costs on
cooperators and selection against agents not forming groups. Obviously, spatial correlations
depend on the dimensionality of the model, and it is well known that different simulated spatial
outlays produce different evolutionary dynamics (i.e.,Iftia et al. 2004; Lieberman et al. 2005;
Ohtsuki et al. 2006; Santos et al. 2006).
4.3
A rather counter-intuitive result of this study is that with H, cooperative behavior, is less
sensitive to the cost of cooperation than under G, even though the latter always produces the
highest proportion of co in the system when cooperation is at no cost. This result could be
suggesting that biological evolution is better in tracking fine, fast-occurring differences in
fitness landscapes than learning from peers, as the latter is better in keeping the "memory" of
the system. For the same reasons, social roles evolving under a G scenario are more susceptible
of getting trapped in local optima in rough fitness landscapes compared to social roles
changing under the H scenario.
4.4
Our results are in agreement with those of a model just published (Acerbi and Parisi 2006),
which compared cultural transmission between and within generations in a context involving
learning and using a much more complex modeling framework. This coincidence of results
might serve as a fist validation of our model. This exercise showed that even at the highest level
of abstraction, represented by an extremely simple one-dimensional model, important
differences between cultural and biological evolution emerge. Thus, conclusions drawn by
simulations implemented in economy, in which evolution is represented as H (e.g.,Axelrod
1989; Fehr and Fischbauer 2003), might not be necessary meaningful to biological evolution
where evolution is represented as G (e.g.,Maynard-Smith and Szathmary 1997) and vice-versa.
Synergies elicited by H + V, the best candidate metaphor for culture in this study, seem
worthwhile of further explorations. Acknowledgements
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